

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00195 01 OF 02 151655Z

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07

IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /089 W

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R 151542Z APR 77

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2087

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0195

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: APRIL 15 WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

THE 134TH MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE FINAL ONE OF THE CURRENT ROUND, TOOK PLACE ON APRIL 15 UNDER US CHAIRMANSHIP. US REP AND SOVIET REP (TARASOV) MADE THE ONLY STATEMENTS. SOVIET REP'S STATEMENT IS BEING REPORTED BY SEPTEL. US REP'S STATEMENT CITED THE UNREALITY OF THE EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH AS A PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS IN THE TALKS, REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF THE DATA DISCUSSION TO DATE, NOTING THAT IT WAS YET TO RESOLVE THE SUBSTANTIAL DISCREPANCY BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN FIGURES FOR WARSAW PACT MILITARY MANPOWER IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND EXPLAINED WHY THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR AN IMMEDIATE PERSONNEL FREEZE

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00195 01 OF 02 151655Z

WAS UNACCEPTABLE. THE MAIN POINTS OF THE US STATEMENT, THE FULL TEXT OF WHICH FOLLOWS BY AIRGRAM, WERE:

1. A PRINCIPAL REASON FOR THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO DATE IS THE UNREALISTIC EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH WHICH WOULD INEQUITABLY SUBJECT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO AN IDENTICAL REDUCTION FORMULA DESPITE THE

WIDE DIFFERENCES AMONG THEM.

2. THESE DIFFERENCES, INCLUDING DIFFERENCES IN MILITARY STRENGTH, GEOGRAPHIC CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THE IMPACT OF REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS, DEFINE THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION AND MUST BE REFLECTED IN AN AGREEMENT.

3. THE EASTERN APPROACH LEAVES OUT OF ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT SOME PARTICIPANTS WOULD ACTUALLY REDUCE THEIR FORCES WHILE OTHERS WOULD ONLY WITHDRAW THEIRS AS WELL AS THE PERMANENT ADVANTAGES CONFERRED ON THE EAST BY THE USSR'S PROXIMITY TO THE REDUCTION AREA.

4. THE EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH IS INEQUITABLE BECAUSE IT WOULD REQUIRE THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO ACCEPT ENDURING INFERIORITY IN MANPOWER AND MOST MAJOR ARMAMENTS, INFERIORITIES WHOSE IMPACT WOULD BE ALL THE GREATER GIVEN THE PROXIMITY OF THE USSR TO THE REDUCTION AREA.

5. NATIONAL CEILINGS AS PROPOSED BY THE EAST (A) WOULD RIGIDLY LIMIT VIRTUALLY ALL THE FORCES OF SOME PARTICIPANTS WHILE LIMITING ONLY THE FORCES IN THE AREA OF OTHERS, (B) WOULD INTERFERE WITH NATO'S INTEGRATED DEFENSE SYSTEM AND PREJUDICE THE FUTURE ORGANIZATION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE, AND (C) COULD CAUSE OVERALL WESTERN FORCE LEVELS TO FALL BELOW THE LEVEL PERMITTED IN AN AGREEMENT.

6. THE WESTERN APPROACH TAKES ACCOUNT OF DIFFERENCES AMONG THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS BY:

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00195 01 OF 02 151655Z

(A) PROVIDING FOR A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE AND OVERALL MILITARY MANPOWER; (B) PROVIDING FOR SELECTIVE ARMAMENTS REDUCTIONS IN A WAY WHICH WOULD DEAL WITH THE COMPLEX PROBLEM OF DIFFERING ARMAMENTS LEVELS ON THE TWO SIDES WITHOUT CONTRACTUALIZING EXISTING DISPARITIES; (C) LEAVING UNLIMITED NON-US WESTERN ARMAMENTS TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LARGE AMOUNTS OF EQUIPMENT, WHICH WOULD REMAIN FREE FROM LIMITATIONS, LOCATED ON SOVIET TERRITORY, (D) PROVIDING FOR PHASED NEGOTIATIONS IN KEEPING WITH THE EXCEPTIONAL MILITARY POTENTIAL OF THE US AND USSR AND THE FACT THAT THEIR FORCES WOULD ONLY BE WITHDRAWN WHILE PARTICIPANTS LOCATED IN THE AREA WOULD HAVE TO ACTUALLY DECREASE THEIR FORCES; AND (E) ESTABLISHING COLLECTIVE CEILINGS WHICH AVOID INTERFERENCE WITH NATO'S INTEGRATED DEFENSE SYSTEM AND PREJUDICE TO THE FUTURE ORGANIZATION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE.

7. SINCE ANY AGREEMENT WOULD REQUIRE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON THE NUMBERS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA, THE

WEST TABLED DATA AT THE OUTSET OF THE TALKS, A MOVE THE EAST ONLY RECIPROCATED MORE THAN TWO AND A HALF YEARS LATER.

8. THERE WAS A CONSIDERABLE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE FIGURES FINALLY TABLED BY THE EAST ON THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE AREA AND WESTERN ESTIMATES OF THOSE FORCES, A DISCREPANCY WHICH HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED IN THE DISCUSSION OF DATA IN THIS ROUND.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00195 02 OF 02 151707Z  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0195

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

9. EASTERN FIGURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH POSITIONS TAKEN BY EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH IMPLIED EASTERN RECOGNITION OF ITS SUPERIORITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER SUCH AS:

A) THE EAST'S FAILURE FOR OVER TWO AND A HALF YEARS EITHER TO CHALLENGE SERIOUSLY THE DATA ON EASTERN FORCES TABLED BY THE WEST OR TO STATE OR IMPLY THE EXISTENCE OF MANPOWER PARITY; AND

B) EASTERN ARGUMENTS THAT REDUCTIONS TO PARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WOULD CHANGE THE OVERALL EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP

OF FORCES IN THE AREA TO WESTERN ADVANTAGE.

10. SUCH EVIDENCE STRENGTHENS WESTERN DOUBTS REGARDING  
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00195 02 OF 02 151707Z

THE COMPLETENESS OF THE EAST'S DATA, WHICH IS AN ISSUE  
THAT CANNOT BE LEFT UNRESOLVED.

11. EASTERN REPS HAVE RENEWED THEIR PROPOSAL THAT  
PARTICIPANTS SHOULD AGREE NOW NOT TO INCREASE THEIR MILITARY  
MANPOWER IN THE AREA FOR THE DURATION OF THE TALKS.

12. TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST, SUCH A MANPOWER FREEZE  
MUST, AS THE WEST HAS PROPOSED, BE LINKED TO A SATISFACTORY  
FIRST PHASE REDUCTION AGREEMENT INCLUDING A COMMITMENT TO  
FURTHER REDUCTIONS TO A FINAL OUTCOME OF MANPOWER PARITY.

13. A FREEZE NEGOTIATED SEPARATELY FROM A REDUCTION  
AGREEMENT WOULD PREJUDICE THE WESTERN POSITION ON PARITY AND  
CONTRACTUALIZE THE EXISTING EASTERN MANPOWER SUPERIORITY.

14. MOREOVER, THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL WOULD BE BASED UPON  
DATA OVER WHICH THERE IS ACTIVE DISAGREEMENT AND  
WOULD, THEREFORE, BE A CONTINUING SOURCE OF EAST-WEST  
MISUNDERSTANDING AND CONTENTION.

15. SINCE AGREED DATA ARE A PREREQUISITE FOR ANY NO-INCREASE  
COMMITMENT, PARTICIPANTS CAN MORE USEFULLY CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS  
TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN EASTERN AND  
WESTERN FIGURES ON WARSAW PACT MANPOWER.

16. ALTHOUGH WESTERN PROPOSALS OF DEC 1975 OFFER A REASONABLE  
AND PRACTICAL BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT, THEY ARE YET TO  
RECEIVE A SERIOUS AND POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE EAST.

17. RATHER, THE EAST HAS CONTINUED TO ADHERE TO ITS  
UNREALISTIC PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD DIMINISH WESTERN SECURITY  
AND ARE, CONSEQUENTLY, UNACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST.

18. INSTEAD, THE EAST SHOULD RESPOND SERIOUSLY TO THE REALISTIC  
PROPOSALS MADE BY THE WEST IN DECEMBER 1975. RESOR  
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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00195 02 OF 02 151707Z

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